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ABSTRACT 
Few theories of gaming enjoyment have focused what is absent in 
gameplay. One exception is Erving Goffman’s sociological theory 
of “euphoric ease”. Because spontaneous and socially demanded 
emotional involvement often align in gameplay, Goffman holds, it 
lacks the effortful self-monitoring and self-regulation of conduct 
and emotion typical for everyday life. This paper presents an em-
pirical grounding of Goffman’s theory, drawing on a qualitative 
interview study on social norms of emotion regulation in video 
game play. Data suggests that the absence of emotional self-
control may indeed be a hygiene factor of game enjoyment most 
strongly found in solitary gameplay, afforded by a socio-material 
setting that licenses gaming-typical emotions and shields from 
potentially disapproving onlookers. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.5.m [INFORMATION INTERFACES AND 
PRESENTATION (e.g., HCI)]: Miscellaneous 
General Terms 
Human Factors. 
Keywords 
Enjoyment, euphoric ease, dysphoric tension, emotion, emotion 
display, emotion work, feeling rules, interaction tension, involve-
ment, video games. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Why is gameplay enjoyable or “fun”? Over the past two decades, 
researchers have exerted considerable effort to answer this ques-
tion [1]. One shared assumption of this work is that enjoyment 
arises from the presence of certain phenomena that generate posi-
tive experiences. Research informed by self-determination theory, 
for instance, posits that games present us with challenging tasks 
and ample success feedback, which together produce positive 
experiences of competence need satisfaction [22]. One may call 
this common denominator enjoyment-as-present-positives. 
However, even the crudest mathematical calculus suggests that 
the overall valence of an experience can be raised in two ways: 
increasing positives and reducing negatives. Beyond longstanding 
philosophical and religious notions of human contentment as the 
absence of negative experience, psychological research indicates 
that both increasing positive and reducing negative emotions are 
important for improving a person’s overall happiness and well-
being [27]. Following this line of reasoning, gameplay likewise 
may be enjoyable – or more precisely, more enjoyable than “typi-
cal” everyday activity – not just because it presents elements that 
generate positive experience, but also because it lacks otherwise 
common elements that generate negative experiences, i.e. enjoy-
ment-as-absent-negatives.  
While there is an abundance of research on gameplay enjoyment 
as present positives [1], little if any work has explored the role of 
such absent negatives. One exception is sociologist Erving 
Goffman. Game research has mainly employed Goffman’s frame 
analysis [19] to theorize the social construction of gameplay 
boundaries (“the magic circle”) [8]. And yet, his essay “Fun in 
Games” [17] entails a genuine sociological theory of gameplay 
enjoyment, grounded in his larger theoretical project of charting 
“the interaction order” [18]. Goffman argues that in gameplay 
situations, what the individual spontaneously wants to get in-
volved in and what is situationally proper to be involved in are 
frequently aligned, freeing the individual from otherwise constant 
effortful, unenjoyable self-monitoring and self-regulation, as well 
as unenjoyable embarrassment over improper conduct. This ab-
sence of “interaction tension” is experienced as “euphoric ease” – 
fun in games ([12], pp. 243-58; [17], pp. 38-58). 
Though not implausible, there has been no empirical work to date 
probing Goffman’s theory. To address this gap, this paper pre-
sents qualitative interview data on one central aspect of interac-
tion tension in video game play: the regulation of emotion and 
emotion display. After outlining Goffman’s theory of interaction 
tension and the methodology of the study, the paper will demon-
strate the specific “feeling rules” of leisurely gameplay, and how 
effortful emotion regulation detracts from game enjoyment. Con-
trary to Goffman’s claim that interaction tension is chiefly an-
chored in the internalized and enacted norms of human actors, 
data indicates that the material features of gaming spaces partake 
in it. Leisurely gameplay predominantly occurs in private spaces 
physically shielded from non-participating others, which reduces 
perceived self-regulation demands. Where mobile devices take 
gameplay into public, interaction tension is more likely. Thus, 
solitary gaming in private spaces was reported as the least regulat-
ed and hence most enjoyable. The conclusion will contexualize 
the findings in contemporary game enjoyment research, point out 
limitations, and end with research directions opened by it. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The overarching goal of Erving Goffman’s work was to establish 
“the interaction order” as a social phenomenon of its own right 
[18]: everyday face-to-face interaction is grounded in its own 
preconditions (first and foremost response presence: the ability to 
mutually perceive and act on one another, in mutual reflexive 
awareness of this fact); it shows its own orderliness, regularities, 
and types (notably frames as types of social situations [19]); and it 
is reproduced by its own interconnected processes – a “little social 
system” of its own ([14], p. 196). Goffman identifies two inter-
twined mechanisms that keep face-to-face interaction running, and 
running orderly: embarrassment and involvement.  
Humans are social beings: their physical and emotional survival 
depends on others. From birth to old age, human individuals 
therefore have to maintain the affection, benevolence, and trust of 
their conspecifics. The survival of human societies in turn de-
pends on individuals behaving reliably and competently. Embar-
rassment is the social glue that ensures both in everyday interac-
tion ([13]; [15], pp. 6-45): In tune with contemporary social 
psychology [21], Goffman argues that embarrassment is a reflex-
ive social emotion emerging relatively late in individual develop-
ment. As children start forming a notion of their self based on 
other’s responses to them across a variety of situations, they also 
internalize their society’s norms of proper and improper, compe-
tent and incompetent behavior for different roles in different situa-
tions (e.g., how to be a proper “guest” when “going to a restau-
rant”). If we fail to abide by these norms, others will likely 
devalue and distrust us. Embarrassment internalizes this imagined 
disapproval of others into self-devaluation, which motivates the 
individual to prospectively avoid acting in ways that would trigger 
embarrassment, and to retrospectively engage in social repair 
work after an inappropriate action: Blushing, apologies and 
amends signal that the action was an unintentional mishap and 
that the individual can be trusted to be otherwise competent and 
mindful of social norms ([16], pp. 113-114). 
A central dimension regulated by such situational norms is “the 
structure of involvement in the situation” ([14], p. 193): who may 
legitimately open, join, leave, or close what shared focus of atten-
tion and action under what conditions; how deeply attentively 
absorbed one may get in this focus; and how strongly emotionally 
involved one may get in it. As social creatures, we have a natural 
propensity to get “engrossed” or unselfconsciously lost in joint 
foci of attention, action, and emotion ([17], p. 35; [19], p. 346). 
Furthermore, involvement is socially contagious: in observing one 
another, we spiral each other out of it by becoming mutually self-
consciousness of our lack of involvement, or spiral each other into 
mutual engrossment ([12], pp. 243-244; [17], pp. 38-44). This 
experience of “joint spontaneous involvement” ([15], p. 113), 
prototypical in the “crowd madness” of soccer fans at a match, is 
a central source of social cohesion and mobilization – hence the 
need for societies to tightly regulate it. 
Together, embarrassment and involvement generate what 
Goffman calls “interaction tension” ([12], pp. 243-257, [14], pp. 
38-41). Whenever we interact with others, things tend to feel ei-
ther “flowing smoothly” or “awkward” and “dragging”. This ex-
perience, Goffman holds, arises from the degree to which partici-
pants are able to produce a stream of interaction that effortlessly 
excites and binds joint involvement. ([12], pp. 243-244) The nor-
mal state of affairs in everyday life is “dysphoric tension”: be-
cause there is usually “some discrepancy between obligatory in-
volvements and spontaneous ones” ([14], p. 40), actors have to 
engage in constant effortful and unpleasant self-monitoring and 
self-regulation to fit their involvement into the demands of the 
situation and prevent embarrassments. This is especially the case 
for emotion and emotion display: We have to show proper ex-
citement over a friend’s fortune, hide boredom at a public event, 
suppress anger at an impolite passer-by and laughter at a church 
service. “Flooding out” ([14], p. 62; [19], pp. 375-376) describes 
the embarrassing situation where people are unable to contain 
their emotional responses, bursting into uncontrolled laughter, 
tears, or rage. In the rare case that the actors’ spontaneous needs, 
wants, and interests align with the proprieties of the situation, they 
can allow themselves to get engrossed, to stop reflexively moni-
toring and controlling their attention, action, and emotion ([19], p. 
378). The resultant positive, pleasurable experience is “euphoric” 
ease ([14], p. 38).  
In gaming, “euphoric interaction is relatively often achieved: 
gaming is often fun” ([14], p. 39). This is the case because gaming 
encounters unite games, purpose-built to be “engrossables” ([19], 
p. 57) that spontaneously attract and bind joint involvement, with 
the situational norms of gaming encounters which allow (and 
demand) deep involvement in gameplay. That is, gameplay is not 
enjoyable because it features somehow “less” norms for emotional 
involvement than other situations. Rather, it allows and disallows 
specific kinds of emotion and emotion display, and is designed to 
make participants frequently spontaneously experience and want 
to express just these emotions such that the existence of norms – 
in the form of effortful self-control or embarrassment – disappears 
from awareness. The paradox of gameplay is that it is “shared, 
obligatory, spontaneous involvement.” ([14], p. 39) Fun or eu-
phoric ease arises when obligatory norms align with spontaneous 
wants, not when norms are absent. 
Following the early work of Goffman and Hochschild [32], a rich 
strand of symbolic interactionist sociology has since explored how 
groups reproduce a shared emotional culture of “feeling rules” for 
different roles and situations, and how individuals have to engage 
in “emotion work” to fit their experience and action into these 
[31,33]. Goffman’s theory of the sociality of emotional involve-
ment has found a similar uptake [3,25]. Yet to our knowledge, 
there hasn’t been empirical work on the specific feeling rules and 
emotion work of leisurely video game play. And while Goffman’s 
“Fun in Games” figures in sociological accounts of gameplay [8], 
its theory of fun as euphoric ease has remained untested. In the 
course of a larger qualitative interview study on the social norms 
of video game play among German adult gamers, we came across 
multiple player reports that aligned with but also qualified 
Goffman’s theory, specifically with regard to emotional involve-
ment. As we pursued an open, grounded theory approach, this 
emergent network of concepts became part of the larger inter-
viewing, sampling, and coding strategy, even though it was not 
the focal point of the overall study. Hence, for the purposes of the 
present study, we reanalyzed the data with an explicit focus on 
interaction tension and emotional involvement.  
3. METHOD 
In the overarching study, we combined episodic interviews [10] 
with directed qualitative content analysis [20]. We construed an 
initial semi-structured interview script with key aspects of situa-
tional frames taken from Goffmanian frame analysis [19]: set-
tings, objects, roles, internal organization, metacommunication, 
attention, emotion, rules for action and communication, and situa-
tional boundaries. For each aspect, we invited participants to re-
port biographical incidents they considered “prototypical” for 
leisurely gameplay, and incidents where norms regarding that 
aspect were breached. 
We initially recruited participants who engaged in “canonical” 
leisurely gameplay as well as “atypical” forms such as e-sports 
and gameplay-as-work performed by game journalists, designers, 
and researchers. Our rationale was that actively encouraging par-
ticipants to compare and contrast memories of canonical and atyp-
ical gameplay situations would foreground otherwise taken-for-
granted norms of leisurely gameplay. We also aimed to maximize 
diversity in participants’ age, gender, and experience across dif-
ferent game genres, devices, and social contextures in our initial 
interviewing sample.  
To ensure openness and empirical grounding of our concepts, we 
followed the grounded theory principles of constant comparison 
and theoretical sampling [4]: we gathered and coded data in paral-
lel, comparing each new datum against existing concepts, revis-
ing, refining, or adding concepts as required by the data, also re-
vising the interview script and choosing new participants based on 
emerging new questions and hypotheses until we reached theoret-
ical saturation [4], that is, until new data did not force revision of 
the concepts. We conducted 19 interviews with an average length 
of 90 minutes until we reached saturation, which matches previ-
ous findings that about 90% code saturation is achieved around 12 
interviews [30]. In sum, we collected about 1,900 minutes of au-
dio recordings together with field notes and participant illustra-
tions of their various gameplay settings. All interviews were tran-
scribed and all material was coded using the qualitative data 
analysis software MAXQDA (version 10.0). 
For the present paper, we re-analyzed our data, initially starting 
with 222 passages coded for “emotion” and “interaction tension” 
in the original study, building a new code set for the purposes of 
this analysis. The following interview excerpts have been translat-
ed from the German original, which is accessible together with 
transcription conventions in [8]. 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Popular media images like Phillip Toledano’s photography series 
“Gamers” [24] suggest that gameplay is intensely emotional, with 
players so deeply engrossed that they lose any conscious poise, 
their faces contorted in pure expressions of joy, surprise, anger, or 
frustration. Our interview data suggests the opposite: Players re-
ported that they regularly manage their emotions during game-
play, revealing a rich landscape of considerations and circum-
stances attenuating what emotion to display how intensely when.  
4.1 The Regulation of Emotion (Display) 
On the one hand, intense emotion and emotion display is indeed 
understood to be a normal part of video gaming, especially if 
players agree to play competitively against each other. Even ag-
gressive emoting that would be completely inappropriate in e.g. 
normal conversation is par for the course because the frame of a 
gaming encounter earmarks it as “non-serious”, not targeted at the 
actual biographical person of the other. Says one player: 
“Anger, aggression when you’re playing video games together 
with, (2s) via network, via Internet, (3s) those are all things ac-
companying gameplay, that are often also playful. (...) Nothing 
that is wrong or so.” 
Interviewer: “Any situation, where you, when you say frustration 
or aggression, do you remember a situation where someone took 
that the wrong way?” 
Player: “*No*, no, no. That’s with the people with whom I’ve 
played up to now, so that they (3s) take that in a way, that it 
shows me, they see that similarly. Evaluate that in the same way, 
are apparently (2s) socialized similarly, know that that’s part of 
gaming and not meant in a malign manner, is even part of the 
whole.” (P4/600-608) 
Then again, even aggression display has limits of propriety. As 
one member of an online shooter clan noted, because “younger 
players” (he himself was above 30) would engage in too aggres-
sive language (“flaming”), his clan decided to not allow anyone 
below the age of 23 to join. 
As suggested by Goffman, players reported involvement and dis-
involvement to be socially contagious, especially in cooperative 
multiplayer games, wherefore they engaged (and expected each 
other to engage) in practices of mutual in-group uptalking and 
out-group downtalking (trashing, teasing, taunting) to stoke arous-
al. Players considered showing a minimum degree of emotional 
involvement to be a positive demand of gaming encounters. In the 
words of one: 
“Yes, so in a group game, in a group game it is expected that you 
show elation when you have achieved something, somehow. That 
is, you should show that then. (3s) You should certainly also be 
appropriately frustrated when something doesn’t work, and not 
say: <<Ahh, who cares.>> And then, not in online games, but in 
group situations like with the Kinect, there it’s certainly also the 
case that you should appropriately be happy for somebody else, if 
somebody made a new high score, because that’s certainly social-
ly, like, desired.” (P2/260) 
Just as displayed involvement is contagious, to display complete 
emotional disinvestment in gameplay would diminish the experi-
ence for the others. One would become a spoilsport making the 
others self-consciously aware of their own now potentially inap-
propriate ‘over’-involvement in a ‘silly’ game, or their lack of 
regard for the spoilsport’s own lack of enjoyment.  
Similarly, entailed in the gaming norms to be a “good winner” and 
“good loser” is to show measured-but-not-excessive involvement 
in one’s victory or loss: One should visibly enjoy one’s victory – 
but watch out that one’s display does not hurt the losers’ feelings. 
As a loser, although one should put visible effort into winning 
until the last moment, when the game outcome is resolved, one 
should congratulate the winner and immediately stop minding the 
fact that one has lost. Says one player:  
“If you lose, you have to accept that and shouldn’t play the of-
fended, but continue to grin and bear it, stand above it. And a 
winner shouldn’t celebrate too boisterously that he won.” 
(P9/125) 
Thus, being a “sore loser” means letting one’s emotion display 
impinge on the others, as this player put it: 
“No, you are a sore loser if you, if you burden the others with 
your own frustration. That means, when you vent your anger and, 
and, and you’re in a sour mood and that becomes a burden for the 
others. So otherwise, I mean, that you get angry when you lose, 
that’s alright. That’s normal. You play in order to win and not to 
lose. But when you then become annoying for the others, because 
you get into a sour mood or say: <<I don’t want to play any-
more>> or are even offended... then, then I find that a sore loser.” 
(P17/444) 
In the same way, players noted that they would tone down their 
own celebrations of success or taunting of others’ failures if they 
noticed that this might ‘seriously’ hurt an other – again making 
sure that emotion display maintains proper regard to the other: 
“For example, we had, let’s say, when a player from my team, 
what also happened, for instance had just broken up with his girl-
friend. Then you’re a little down, or you’re angry. And then, for 
instance, you should, when you notice that, shouldn’t taunt him on 
top of that.” (P15/327) 
Gaming encounters provide a legitimate stage for intense emotion 
and emotion display. Apart from showing proper emotional in-
volvement and watching out for the other player’s enjoyment, a 
third norm we found is that while one is allowed to have and show 
intense feelings, one has to modulate their display in such way 
that it can still be credibly interpreted by others as disinvested, 
‘not-serious’ involvement one can easily detach from: self but not 
self. Emotional intensity is allowed to the extent that players dis-
play the capacity to immediately contain it again – that is, be a 
trustworthy, rational social actor. This signaling is usually 
achieved through laughter, humor, or irony marks. A real norm 
breach occurs if a player cannot convincingly disinvest his or her 
biographical self from her player role in the gaming encounter. 
Here is how one player put into words his unease about a col-
league that breached that norm: 
“If somebody, who sees that differently, and for that person it’s 
extremely important, and he says: <<That is *me* who has ad-
vanced here>>, then that’s something I don’t understand. If he 
also signals happiness and says: <<Great.>> And for me it doesn’t 
have just the appearance anymore, or just the: <<I had a success 
in the game and I’m proud that I achieved a certain point in the 
game, that is part of the game and I made another level.>> No, if 
the other says: <<I grew *myself* as a person>>, because he 
achieved something in the game. And this mixing, if I hear real 
floodings of emotion or something like that, that really isn’t nec-
essary.” (P4/484) 
Interestingly, social bonds seemed to lower the boundaries of 
socially demanded emotion regulation, because then others are 
able to interpret the player’s emotion display in the total context 
of their previous interactions, instead of considering it strange. As 
one player observed, if she plays with friends, 
“Getting a bit upset is okay. Also to give the other a bit, I also find 
it okay, if you just pulled the ball between his legs and he, or you 
had a wonderful goal against him, and then provoke him naughti-
ly. (3s) But that you only do with friends. So I don’t think that I 
would like that, if I would stand at a console in the supermarket, 
or at the Media Markt [a German retail chain for electronics] or 
somewhere, and play against someone unknown there, then, then I 
might show him my triumph, but, but I don’t let him feel, that he 
is an asshole. Or that I just, let’s say that I just took him for a ride. 
Instead I just show him that I won, I’m happy about that, and 
showing happiness is okay then. But I believe it is, in, this, it’s 
like a social norm: So I think, when I, with friends I can be a bit 
more rough, especially if I know them a little longer. With, with 
unknown people I’m a bit more restrained, I think.” (P7/231-237) 
Finally, especially players with a more intense gaming biography, 
whose biographical self is invested in their identity as a skilled 
gamer, would make a point of maintaining gameworthy poise. As 
one player noted, even though he might feel “hatred” towards 
another player beating him repeatedly, he would not reveal that: 
“so when I’m continually killed by the same player, then you 
effectively develop such a kind of hatred. But that’s not like I 
would have something against that human being personally, but 
simply against the way he plays. So tha- that’s effectively also an 
admission that you are inferior. (3s) But that I would (2s) 
wouldn’t say.” 
Interviewer: “What kind of reaction do you show instead?” 
Player: “Nothing.” 
Interviewer: “Nothing.” 
Player: “No, that’s really. There I completely contain myself. 
Because that, that is, as I said, such a matter of honor.” (P5-1/187-
191) 
Elsewhere [15], Goffman argues that in modern societies, “action” 
– safe, pseudo-consequential activities like gambling, extreme 
sports or watching action movies – serves as a legitimate social 
stage especially for men to display socially valued “character”: 
cool, poise, and determination in the face of fate. The safe risk of 
(competitive) gameplay may function as one such stage. 
In summary, three overarching norms seem to regulate emotion 
display in leisurely video game play: First, one should pay proper 
regard to the others’ selves by ensuring that one’s emotive expres-
sions do not seriously hurt their feelings or are (mis)construed as 
literal aggression or malign intent. Second, one should pay proper 
regard to the others’ enjoyment by ensuring that one’s displayed 
involvement supports and amplifies rather than derails theirs. 
Third, one should ensure that one’s own biographical self remains 
unspoilt: one must credibly maintain the impression that one is 
capable of containing emotions elicited by gameplay and not let 
them spill over into one’s social life beyond the game. All three 
norms hinge to a large extent on the ability to credibly display 
intense emotion while at the same time credibly displaying that 
these emotions are not ‘meant’ literally. Inappropriate “flooding 
out” occurs where players are not able to maintain this impression 
of disinvolved involvement anymore. These observations mesh 
well with Goffman’s general account of involvement regulation. 
So what about his specific theory of enjoyment: euphoric ease? 
4.2 The Absent Presence of Euphoric Ease  
When probed to retell memories of enjoyment or typical emotions 
in video game play, players reported a broad range of experiences 
well-familiar to enjoyment researchers [1]: competence, arousal 
and suspense, curiosity, relatedness, relaxation, social connection, 
success, and the like. Interestingly, none of their memories of 
positive experience were connected to the perceived absence of 
emotional self-regulation or worrying about embarrassment due to 
failed emotion work. Conversely, players could easily produce 
memories where the presence of perceived social norms impeding 
their spontaneously desired emotion and emotion display would 
impede their enjoyment. Such moments came with a general di-
minished intensity of emotion, and the experience that one cannot 
let oneself get fully engrossed in gameplay. Here is how one play-
er described the unpleasantness of having to regulate his emotions 
when he plays in a train cabin under the eyes of others: 
“Well, it’s simply distracting. So although, well, I am somehow in 
flow, in quotation marks, and immersed and in there, so I still 
catch myself as I am then still somehow, as I::: can’t focus one the 
game one hundred percent” (P10/403)      
Interestingly, the only report describing a positive experiential 
quality connected to the absence of interaction tension pertains to 
solitary play. As one game designer noted, when playing alone at 
home, she would experience a positive sense of freedom not felt 
when playing with friends or at the office in order to analyze 
competitor games. She felt 
“Freedom I would also say, certainly in the private context, be-
cause there I can simply show all emotions that I develop when I 
play this game. And that I of course don’t have when I’m sitting 
in the office. That’s not a feeling of freedom. I would say, if I had 
the opportunity to play Battlefield in the office, I would enjoy it 
less because I then don’t have this feeling of freedom.” 
Interviewer: “Is that experience of freedom also present when you 
play together with several people on your couch?” 
Player: “Y::::, to a certain extent it is, yes, but there the consider-
ateness for the friends dominates, for the people with whom I’m 
sitting there. So then it’s less the case, that I focus on the game 
and say: <<I am now, now I am free and can determine this.>> 
Instead it’s also more about me being the host, and being a guest 
of somebody and still take regard of that.” (P9/309-311) 
As the player put it in another context:  
“So if I feel unobserved, in my private rooms, then I can show any 
emotion, because there would be nothing inappropriate in doing 
so, because I wouldn’t offend anyone with it. At most I would 
offend myself ((laughs)).” (P9/225) 
This observation repeats itself across interviews: Players reported 
a complete absence of perceived demands of emotion regulation 
when they would play solitarily: 
Interviewer: “((When you’re playing on the iPad, are)) there any 
feelings that one should better control, not show openly?” 
Player: “No. There I am by myself. I have no contact with others 
and when I don’t want to anymore, I stop.” (P17/738-740) 
We can see that contrary to Goffman’s suggestion, euphoric ease 
as the absence of friction between spontaneous wants and social 
demands is usually not a positive figure in video game play expe-
rience (or at least, memories thereof). However, it still seems to 
play a significant role in gameplay enjoyment, only as a condi-
tional ‘hygiene factor’ that has to be (and apparently often is) 
present for other, remembered positive experiences to be able to 
come to the fore. Second, Goffman’s own focus on face-to-face 
interaction and the multiplayer games of his days led him to over-
look solitary gameplay as a type of gaming encounter with the 
least dysphoric tension because there are no response-present 
others to take into regard. This matches the psychological finding 
that people feel less embarrassed about situational mishaps when 
they perceive no audience present able to observe and judge their 
behavior [21]. Which in turn matches the observation that players 
also felt little need to regulate their emotion when they played 
anonymously online: 
Interviewer: “How is it when you’re playing online? Is it the 
same?” 
Player: “There you get agitated... There you usually sit alone here 
and then you get even more, so I some- times get loud, or some-
thing. But ((puffs)).” 
Interviewer: “So while you’re in front, while you play [you work 
yourself-]” 
Player: “[Yes, exactly,] while I play. Yes (3s) what do I know, 
you say <<Shit hobo!>>, or something, and... but he doesn’t, he 
doesn’t hear it then. So it’s not like he would notice it, or so. But 
yes, so there it’s not so...” 
Interviewer: “And that would not happen when you’re playing 
with friends on your couch?” 
Player: “Yes, I think I wouldn’t insult them. (...)” 
Interviewer: “Okay. But, would you, when you sit with your 
friends on a table, get upset as well? So?”  
Player: “Yes, you get upset as well. Sure. But that’s then:::, yes, 
that’s then not as permanent and not as loudly. So if you sit alone 
here, then you more often let your feelings run free, than if you sit 
together with a group or so, and get upset about something.” 
(P19/89-96) 
In short, both solitary and anonymous online gameplay lack a 
response-present audience of to-be-regarded others, lowering the 
demands of emotion regulation. Which brings us to a second 
amendment to Goffman’s initial phrasing of interaction tension. 
4.3 A Room of One’s Own: Socio-Material 
Preconditions 
When Goffman penned “Fun in Games”, the social reality of 
gameplay he reported on was one of board and card games played 
and home or in casinos. However, laptops, smartphones and other 
mobile gaming devices have dislocated game play from such ded-
icated gaming settings and transposed them into other, public 
settings dedicated to other activities. As such, mobile and perva-
sive games present an almost natural ‘breaching experiment,’ 
disrupting standing social practices and constellations to fore-
ground the previously taken-for-granted. What they reveal is that 
the lack of a potentially disapproving and regard-demanding audi-
ence is no simple given of solitary gaming. Rather, it is a socio-
material accomplishment, as the following excerpt shows: 
Interviewer: “If you play a mobile game, is there, in comparison 
to playing at home alone in front of the console, is there a differ-
ence in what emotions you can or are allowed to express?” 
Player: “Since I am then mostly in a public surrounding, loud 
screaming or throwing that thing in the corner are not an option. 
Although you would really want to do it, you have to restrain 
yourself a bit there and, let’s put it this way, appear a bit more 
suited for public.” (P7/ 269-271) 
Solitary video game play in not gaming-dedicated settings is prob-
lematic on two accounts. Firstly, it potentially breaches the social 
norms of the prevailing situation. Again, to be considered a trust-
worthy, benign social actor and not embarrass oneself, one has to 
render one’s behavior appropriate and even more basically, intel-
ligible in the given context. As one player noted, when he played 
StarCraft online on his laptop communicating with his team 
members via VoIP in his mother’s kitchen, he would feel embar-
rassment when his mother entered the room, who did not know 
the game: 
“if somebody, somebody who has now clue about, no view of the 
game and hears me talking. So that’s somehow awkward for me, 
because somebody who doesn’t know what I’m doing just hears 
these weird, cryptic communicative lumps of language from me.” 
(P10/221-237) 
In dedicated ‘gaming grounds’ like casinos or arcade halls, gam-
ing behavior is appropriate and expected: provide a context for 
making intelligible behavior that would be atypical thus ‘strange’ 
in other contexts.  
Second, it is taken for granted but significant that leisurely video 
game play, according to the interviewed players, predominantly 
takes place in their private bedroom or living room at home. This 
social place not only comes with the social license to be left alone 
and unobserved (formalized in many country’s privacy laws): the 
“furnished frame” ([16], p. 284) of the house also provides a 
physical shielding from the looks (and thus, judgments and regard 
demands) of passing onlookers. As the same player continues, he 
also attempts to play games on his laptop when travelling on train. 
However, he still found this a suboptimal place because the pres-
ence of others kept him from fully letting himself immerse in the 
game. To reduce this issue, he would create a physical shielding 
from the views of other passengers by placing himself in a corner 
of the cabin where he would not be easily seen: 
“I’m somebody who then also enjoys the, the, the protection of 
your, your own, your own row of seats. Also as, as a form of 
blinds. (...) Most importantly, that I have such, such a little two- 
two seat row for myself. If there’s like a high seat before and be-
hind me. And there, well I (4s), so well, even there I would:::: if I 
would, like, play a bit more frequently there, then maybe I 
wouldn’t be like, that I would say to myself, okay, now I suppress 
emotions here. But I still would not laugh out loud.” (P10/361-
363) 
To be sure, players did report engaging in gameplay with mobile 
devices in public spaces. However, this was reported only for  
transit or waiting settings (on trains, subways, airplanes, at a doc-
tor’s waiting room), or in recreational settings like hotel beds, 
deck chairs next to hotel swimming pools, or cafés. What unites 
both types of settings is that individual attentive disengagement 
from the wider situation and engagement in a private, time-filling 
“subordinate involvement” ([14], p. 51) like newspaper reading or 
gaming is considered appropriate. You can play a mobile game on 
a subway without raising legitimate eyebrows, but not during 
class, or at least there you have to make an effort to appear to hide 
it and show remorse when caught. 
Summing up, the interview data indicated two preconditions for 
euphoric ease in video game play: that it takes place in a setting 
where video game play (and the emotion display it engenders and 
demands) is socially legitimate and expected, and/or in a setting 
where players are physically shielded from the eyes of potentially 
uninitiated, disapproving others. As gaming arcades and casinos 
show, the two usually go together: Even where we play games in 
semi-public places, we do so to an ‘initiated’ public expected to 
share or at least know and respect the collective intention to en-
gage in gaming, physically shielded from a public-at-large. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present paper, we analyzed data from a qualitative inter-
view study on social norms of emotion and emotion display in 
video game play among German adult gamers to probe Goffman’s 
theory of gameplay enjoyment as euphoric ease. Gaming encoun-
ters, he posited, present us with the paradox of obligatory sponta-
neous involvement. Because games are designed as “engrossa-
bles” ([19], p. 57), eliciting spontaneous involvement, and 
because the social norms of gaming allow and demand deep in-
volvement, spontaneous and socially demanded involvement often 
align in leisurely gameplay, such that the negative experience of 
effortful self-control falls away and the positive experience of 
effortless engrossment and ease emerge.  
In line with Goffman’s broader account of the interaction order, 
interviewed players reported a rich and nuanced set of social 
norms for emotion (display) observed in video game play, paying 
proper symbolic regards to their own self as well as the self and 
enjoyment of co-present others: Emotion display should support 
not detract from the other players’ enjoyment; it should not seri-
ously hurt the others’ feelings or be (mis)construed as literal ag-
gression; and it should maintain that one is capable of keeping 
gameplay emotions separate from one’s biographical self and 
social life beyond the gameplay encounter. That is, gameplay 
shows a paradoxical form of disinvolved involvement: it is al-
lowed to be emotionally serious to the degree that it can be credi-
bly signaled to not be taken seriously. 
Analysis furthermore suggested three amendments to Goffman’s 
theory. First, euphoric ease – the absence of interaction tension – 
is less a positive figure of player experience than a negative 
ground, a hygiene factor of game enjoyment. Second, solitary 
gameplay, vastly facilitated by computers as opponents [5], is the 
type of gaming encounter most free from interaction tension, and 
potentially enjoyable because of that: it is the only instance for 
which players reported the freedom from social demands as a 
positive experience of its own. Third, two important socio-
material components of (solitary) gaming encounters affording 
euphoric ease are a wider social setting in which gameplay, 
gameplay emotion, and its display are legitimate, and a physical 
setting that shields from potentially disapproving, regard-
demanding others. 
5.1 Limitations 
As a qualitative study with a small and culturally homogenous 
sample, the present study cannot (and does not want to) make 
claims toward broad generalizability, especially since social 
norms of conduct and forms of embarrassment are strongly local-
ized in cultures [21]. It can also not claim reliability in any statis-
tical sense, though in the qualitative sense that data collection, 
transcription, and analyses were transparently documented [11]. 
The purpose of the present paper was not to test, but to empirical-
ly ground and refine Goffman’s theory of interaction tension with 
regard to emotion regulation in video game play. The presented 
account is indeed grounded in that it is congruent with and can 
explain all collected data. One important limitation here is that as 
a pure data re-analysis, we did not engage in continued data col-
lection and analysis to the point of theoretical saturation for the 
focal question of this present paper. 
5.2 Contextualization 
Our findings on the existence of feeling rules and emotion work in 
video game play encounters are in line with contemporary socio-
logical research on the matter [31,33], as is the observation that 
emotion (display) in video game play can be socially contagious 
[3,25]. The observation that co-present others actualize social 
norms and thus, self-monitoring and self-regulation is likewise in 
line with findings in the social psychology of embarrassment [21]. 
Goffman’s multidimensional concept of involvement is obviously 
out of sync and thus needs alignment with contemporary research 
on immersion and involvement (e.g., [2,29]) – something that is 
outside the scope of this paper. Even so, his theory – and the ob-
servations presented here – have many promising connections to 
current game enjoyment research, first and foremost mood man-
agement theory (MMT) and flow theory (FT).  
MMT argues that people selectively attend to media to improve 
their mood, amongst other aspects media with intervention poten-
tial, that is, the ability to absorb attention such that no cognitive 
resources are left to ruminate on negative thoughts [28]. Games 
are seen as a prime example of highly absorbing and arousing 
media [28]. Csikszentmihalyi’s original rendition of FT similarly 
argues that the human mind evolved to naturally drift towards 
(unenjoyable but adaptive) worry and cognitive disorder [6]. 
“Flow” describes an “optimal state” of experience where the mind 
is ordered and worry-free because it is fully absorbed. Activities 
like gameplay are flow-inducing because they give the mind a 
ready structure as well as a taxing-but-attainable challenges and 
continuous action-feedback loops that absorb cognition [6].  
As can be seen, Goffman, MMT and FT all hold that one aspect of 
(gameplay) enjoyment is the absence of negative experiences 
(self-consciousness, effortful self-regulation, and thwarted inter-
ests, worry, disorder) entailed in an absorbed attention. For MMT 
and FT, involvement actively suppresses or reduces negative ex-
perience; for Goffman, socially misaligned involvement causes it. 
In this, Goffman not so much contradicts as complements the 
individualistic models of MMT and FT with a social dimension: 
only if well-designed games stoke arousal and bind attention and 
that form of arousal and attention is permissible in the given con-
text does full absorption or flow occur. Otherwise, processes of 
regulating them to fit social demands take away from full in-
volvement.  
This leaves the interesting question how to psychologically ac-
count for what makes interaction tension unenjoyable. One obvi-
ous candidate mechanism would be cognitive dissonance [9]; 
another, goal conflict [26]. Third, self-regulation may involve a 
necessary constant attention switching between main task and 
self-regulation, reducing full attentive absorption. Fourth, self-
regulation may itself be a form of worry that comes with negative 
affect. A fifth contender, closer to current game enjoyment re-
search, is self-determination as conceptualized in Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) [7]. Following SDT, when people 
perceive themselves to act autonomously, self-determinedly, in 
congruence with their own goals, values, identity, and spontane-
ous interests, they satisfy a basic psychological need for autono-
my, which is experienced as enjoyable [7]. This meshes with the 
fact that players described the absence of interaction tension as 
“freedom”. In contrast, if people perceive themselves to act in-
autonomously, controlled and coerced by either external rewards 
and punishments or internalized social demands, this thwarts the 
need for autonomy, generating unenjoyable experiences of pres-
sure and unwillingness [7] – exactly what Goffman described as 
“dysphoric tension.” What his accounts adds is again the social 
dimension, understanding autonomy and control experiences as a 
function – a “euphoria function” ([17], p. 40) of both individual 
dispositions and situational norms. 
One immediate task for future work is thus to not just experimen-
tally validate the presented findings, but to tease out the exact 
psychological processes mediating between the mismatch of de-
sired and appropriate involvement and experienced “interaction 
tension”. Another is to specify our findings for different game 
genres, gaming modes, and groups [8]: What are the feeling rules 
of different cultures and communities? Does competitive Chess 
play differ from competitive e-sports differ from casual gaming? 
5.3 Outlook 
If research has revealed one thing, then that “the fun in games” is 
not a solitary thing, but rather many things to many people [1], a 
complex multitude of sometimes interweaving, sometimes sepa-
rate processes and phenomena. Just like the field of motivational 
psychology from which it draws, game enjoyment research should 
embrace this post-paradigmatic plurality ([23], p. 45). In this vein, 
this paper intended to explore but one sub-process of the complex 
mesh that is gameplay. In so doing, we hope to encourage future 
research into two under-explored dimensions of gameplay enjoy-
ment: social processes, and ‘absent negatives’ or hygiene factors. 
By and large, gameplay enjoyment research has used psychologi-
cal theories to study solitary gameplay in laboratory experiments. 
An artifact of this research paradigm is that social dimensions of 
gameplay enjoyment have not come into view – at most in the 
shape of co-present others supporting social presence and related-
ness needs [34,35]. Importantly, research has missed that solitary 
gameplay is itself a specific and consequential social setting: The 
very fact that others are absent, and legitimately so, holds social 
significance, affects experience and behavior. Just like the players 
cited in these pages had difficulty actively recalling the absence of 
interaction tension, so we as researchers sometimes have difficul-
ty seeing the obvious and absent in our research paradigms. One 
enduring promise of sociology is to make the elusive obvious 
visible, and give voice to the absent. Interaction tension is certain-
ly only the first in a long list of overlooked game enjoyment phe-
nomena it might bring into view for us. 
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